Governance
CrowdProof uses a DAO governance model where token holders vote on protocol changes. This ensures no single entity controls the scoring system.
Governance Scope
Token holders can vote on:
| Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| Scoring Parameters | Decay rate (λ), category weights, confidence thresholds |
| Fee Structure | API pricing tiers, rate limits, free tier allowance |
| Dispute Resolution | Escalated dispute outcomes, arbiter selection |
| Contract Upgrades | Proxy implementation changes, new contract deployments |
| Data Sources | Adding/removing supported chains or protocols |
Governance Process
1. Proposal (requires 100,000 CROWD tokens to submit)
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2. Discussion Period (3 days)
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3. Voting Period (5 days)
• Quorum: 4% of total supply
• Approval: Simple majority (>50%)
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4. Timelock (2 days)
• Allows users to exit if they disagree
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5. Execution (automatic via timelock contract)
CROWD Token
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Token Standard | ERC-20 + ERC-20Votes |
| Total Supply | 100,000,000 CROWD |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Voting Power | 1 CROWD = 1 vote |
Delegation
Token holders must delegate their voting power before it becomes active:
// Self-delegate to activate your own voting power
governanceToken.delegate(msg.sender);
// Or delegate to another address
governanceToken.delegate(delegateAddress);
Delegation does not transfer tokens — only voting power.
Proposal Lifecycle
| State | Description |
|---|---|
Pending | Submitted, awaiting discussion period |
Active | Voting is open |
Succeeded | Quorum met, majority approved |
Defeated | Quorum not met or majority rejected |
Queued | In timelock waiting period |
Executed | Changes applied on-chain |
Canceled | Withdrawn by proposer |
Expired | Not queued within 7 days of success |
On-Chain Dispute Escalation
When off-chain dispute resolution fails, disputes can be escalated to governance:
- User calls
POST /api/v1/dispute/{id}/escalate - Dispute is flagged for
GOVERNANCE_ROLEholders - Token holders vote on the outcome
- If approved, the score is revised on-chain via
ReputationOracle.updateScore()
Security Measures
- Timelock — 2-day delay between vote success and execution
- Quorum — Prevents low-participation attacks
- Proposal Threshold — Prevents spam proposals (100,000 CROWD minimum)
- Vote Snapshot — Voting power locked at proposal creation block (prevents flash loan attacks)